Baker Hamilton Commission – A Washington Drama

The gruesomeness of the tragedy unfolding in Iraq is only exceeded by the incredulous comical posturing exhibited by the players in Washington. The current episode that is running in theatres is called the “Iraq Study Group – A thesis in Policy Output Synthesis with Feedback, Theatrics and Sound Bytes” by Ms. Baker, Hamilton et al.

It is necessary however to rehash the circumstances under which this study was commissioned. Post 9-11 Bush started to look for potential enemies of United States that might get some ideas from 9-11 that may launch dubbed versions of it (which was perpetrated by a band of freelancers with box cutters and approximately $500,000). A capability-intention matrix of nations/actors that could harm the US thru terrorism was drawn. Saddam Hussein in control of an oil rich state with his established animosity (rightly or wrongly) for US and its interests thus ended up in the cross hairs of that matrix.

The primary criticism of the Bush administration, even among the supporters of war is that having decided to remove Saddam, there was no careful planning done for the post-war occupation. But this criticism is not germane to the issue and totally misses the point. The intention going in was never to support a democracy or create a stable government in Saddam’s place. You don’t plan for something that you are not planning to do. The intention I believe was to hand over power to a motley group of exiles/army officers who would keep the oil flowing and get the heck out. However the events in the ground quickly metamorphosed into something totally unmanageable. The current head-ache over Shia/Sunni/Kurd divisions in Iraq was by and large an American creation resultant from the 2 lines drawn in Iraqi sand: 36th parallel northwards and the 33rd parallel southwards after Gulf War I creating No Fly Zones in Kurdish and Shia areas. This is a typical pattern evident in the conduct of US foreign policy when a set of actions are (partially) successful but become stumbling blocks for the next steps. But I digress.

The Bush Administration contrary to its hoary Churchillian rhetoric has been always drawing down troops and intent on a silent fade away into the sunset. Bush keeps saying ‘Iraq is the central front on the war’ on terror, but if you observe the commitment in terms of troops and political energy it befits the motives I laid out here. The democrats are not intent on ‘solving’ this ‘problem’ either. They secretly share Bush’s motive in getting quietly out of Iraq but they are intent on pinning down this ‘failure’ on Bush and Republicans’ neck. The main problem he faces is the high visibility the violence is getting in US media. However that problem is a minor migraine for him compared to the nuclear situation in Iran and its implications for Israel.

So what do politicians the world over do when they are confronted by a ‘problem’ that they don’t think is a problem? Appoint a commission! That’s how the Baker-Hamilton commission led by former Secretary of State James Baker III was born. The mandate for the commission was to take an objective look at the situation from the outside of the US Government and come up with a set of proposals. If Iraq is the central problem for this administration, do they really need a “commission” to tell them how to improve the situation that they know more about than anybody else and are morally and constitutionally bound to? The answer to this rhetorical question is borne by the delicate pantomime enacted by the commission.

First the commission refuses to publish its report before the elections lest it be thought that ‘it is politically motivated’. Goodness Gracious! So a valuable 2 months period when violence is Iraq is raging is lost when indeed if the commission’s suggestions are implementation worthy, they would come out probably past their expiry date. The next joke is the commission met with the cabinet and discussed to gauge their reaction to their recommendations. So Bush says to them “if you are going to propose x,y and z that would not be acceptable to me regardless of the fact that I was the one who tasked you to come up with x, y and z.:” Then the commission backs off and silently leaks portions of its report (of course to NY Times) to get political weight behind it. Then Bush says ’Oh you are playing the leak game ah ? Let me play mine’. Then he lets his national security adviser leak a memo with his own proposals to improve the situation in Iraq. That memo provides the ‘cya’ effect as well as pre-empting Baker-Hamilton its originality. Not to be left out the master in-fighter Rumsfeld on his way out, prepares his own memo outlining his solutions and leaks it. So we have David Sanger and Michael Gordon of NY Times having a blast, counting how many cabinet officials leaked to them that day. Finally just to play down the expectations of those who think Baker-Hamilton is going to come up with the panacea for Iraq and a landing place to make policy corrections for this administration, the national security adviser damps them down by saying that the commission report would be **only one** of the many inputs Bush would be considering!