Kathmandu Or Prachandagarh?

My fingers have been itching to post “something” on Nepal since I started reading Richard Pipes’ “Russian Revolution”. I wanted to postpone the urge for mainly 2 reasons. First, to gain a deeper understanding on how RR played out fully, and the other reason was my very limited knowledge about Nepal. If you want to compare A with B, don’t you have to know about both of them? But I will broadly try to present the similarities and leave the rest to reader’s imagination.

Past

The most striking and most obvious similarity is the triangular relationship between the old guard led by monarchy at odds with the democratic liberals and ranged against the ultra-left revolutionary guerilla force. It fits neatly into the pattern of Tsar vs Duma vs Mensheviks/Bolsheviks. There are also clear similarities between the watermarks too. Like 1905, when Tsar enacted the “fundamental laws” which meant “Constitution” to the Duma and the rest, there was 1990 in Nepal, at the height of the pro-democracy movement led by University students when Monarchy yielded law making to the Nepali Parliament.

After that the comparison turns a little murkier as the Tsar did not yield real power to the Duma, by blocking, obfuscating and bribing its power where as Birendra did not seem to do any of that. But both 1905-1917 Duma and the post 1990 Nepali parliament showed remarkable sense of incompetence and inability to govern a large multi-ethnic country. I tend to think the CPN-UML is playing both the democracy card to be inside and the revolution card to scare the King, which would make them Mensheviks. Now the Bolsheviks in Nepal would be the Maoists who are yet untested in governance and hence present a charming utopian alternative to the “masses” whoever they are. Since they have got nothing to loose, they can promise the moon, sun and everything in between.

In this triangular contest the Monarchy and the Maoists are playing by their own books. The King is strangulating popular dissent, relies more and more on the Army, isolates democrats by locking them up and manipulates the fears of international community against the enemies of his regime. The Maoists are in fact playing exactly like Lenin in strategy, disclaiming the monarchy and the bourgeois democrats, claiming to be the true voice of the “masses”, stopping when blocked by steel and pushing forward when yielded. But their tactics are Maoist; gathering pahari tribes against bourgeois Terai folks engaging in guerilla warfare to sap the morale of the enemy. The only ones who are clueless in this scenario is the mainstream Nepali Congress which is caught between 2 stools.

Like the Tsar’s Army, the RNA is the only stable institution that has some semblance of credibility left. But the majority of the RNA recruits come from hill districts where the government has withdrawn completely. It is staffed by “Kshatriya” officers from the Terai plains who are loyal regime supporters. And the comparisons end there. Now projecting into future, what can we predict?


Future

I am betting that unless the King makes up with the polity and creates a cross-national support base, the Maoists will win. Because in the triangular contest both the democrats and Maoists are gunning for the King’s head: democrats figuratively and the Maoists literally. The democratic polity has to put forth a radical agenda which will let an equitable social order to emerge and keep the King on their side. This is the best situation possible for India. Now India and China are the key silent players in the game and both have obvious high stakes. Both want a stable regime in Nepal. That doesn’t mean they want the same regime. Though in reality the mix of what a stable regime would be in both their imaginations are roughly similar, each want that regime to serve their own interests. So it puts both of us working in cross purposes. Which means China would like to strengthen the King and weaken the democrats. This puts China and the King on the same side and both are not averse to scare the other side (democrats, India) using the Maoist card. If the current course continues, the Maoists will gain more and more control and force India to enter into a low intensity guerilla-military conflict more and more directly, with imponderable consequences.

As for who is behind the Maoist provocation, one probably should ask who gets to benefit from the most of this. Though this may not provide the correct answer all the times, it gives some framework to plan a policy response. India will suffer the most with the Maoist regime on its borders; Bihar and eastern UP already feeling the heat. China doesn't loose anything in that probability. A Maoist regime in Nepal would become a international outcaste instantly. So it will have to turn to China for support and sustenance. China can wring all the concessions it wants in return. That will be standing up the year 1950 on its head.

Cue to Q?

Cue to Q?

During those 3 days when India or at least the politically aware were wondering “Will she or won’t she”, I had argued to my friends the “she shouldn’t” position.

As any “reasoning”, it cannot be separated from my persona, milieu, my emotions and feelings. However I did not want to stake it all on her foreignness.  I conceded to the reality that she had been around as the leader of opposition, had intimate meetings with the ex-PM on sensitive matters involving national security. It was water under the bridge.

The reason was since we are passing thru really tough times which required the PM to take gut-level decisions. Every one of those decision of hers will be looked thru the prism of “foreignness” where as the nation should be concerned only by its merits. We as a nation are not that mature. It would be a tremendous overhead for the polity to function effectively. We probably would never know what really went during those days and nights that made Manmohan Singh the PM.

Now this Q business in the news is troubling me beyond all the obvious reasons. The B.Datta, (ever wondered what that B is and why it should be a secret?) from Law ministry volunteering to the Crown prosecution, the law minister going public in defense of him, at the same time CBI telling the magistrate that it is still trying to extradite Q are the obvious reasons. But my worry is this: she knows that she is known to be personally close to Q, any such (in) voluntary help will revive the controversy, this will be conceived so perilously close to helping a fugitive and this help will be rightly or wrongly connected to her. It is a very safe assumption that she knew this was going to happen even if one cannot assume she ordered it. If she would be willing to let this happen knowing what this entails will mean only either of these things. She is ready to accept the damage hoping that it will be to a level acceptable to her. Or she hopes to limit the damage to a level acceptable to her. If my assumption about her fore-knowledge is wrong it means an over-eager courtier engaged in unauthorized conduct. This means that the courtier thinks that this sort of behavior would please her, which is even more troubling.