In the 60^th anniversary of Indian independence one cannot help looking back to those tumultuous years of our nation's birth. Among the thoughts and emotions that flood our mind, the partition takes a primary role and rightly so; it transformed the political, economical and geo-strategic landscape of the subcontinent. It has deeply influenced, shaped and coloured the events, mindset and direction of the peoples of both India and Pakistan. Not the least, it has given a veritable line of employment to the "Partition" scholarship industry as recently observed by Ramachandra Guha in one of his recent columns^[1]

My intention is not to join a long winded debate about it, but to focus on a narrow aspect: the Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946 and play some "ifs" and "buts" as invited by Irfan Hussain in his recent column in "The Dawn".^[2]

At the outset I wish to make few points.

1. I have chosen to focus almost exclusively on Congress actions. If it appears that I have given a free pass to Jinnah and the League, it is deliberate for the purpose of focusing on the Cabinet mission plan alone and its central aspect, the grouping provisions.
2. The intention is not to "fix" the blame on Congress for the Partition. It would be wholly out of place to blame one event, party or personality for the partition.
3. I have chosen to discuss the issue taking only expressed opinions and facts. I have not tried to second guess or question the motives or indulge in conspiracy theories.


Cabinet Mission Plan: A Background

When the Second World War ended, the British were resigned to the fact that they had to leave India soon. The next question that arose was how and to whom their power should be transferred. One scheme was to transfer power to an interim government on the basis of a constitution framed by one assembly elected on a one man-one vote basis.^[3] The Indian National Congress argued for this scheme. Regarding the minorities, the Congress would go the whole length and would guarantee to protect their religion, culture, personal law, language and the like. However the Muslim League was firmly opposed to this scheme. They claimed that the Muslims of the sub-continent constituted a nation by themselves; they deserve an independent sovereign Pakistan. At any rate, they were not willing to be ruled by a perpetual Hindu majority.

In December 1945 elections were held to the Central legislative assembly. The Congress won 91.3% of votes in Non-Muslims seats and the Muslim League won 86.6% of votes in Muslims seats.^[4]It was amply clear that both had overwhelming support for their positions in their respective consistencies and none could convince the other side. Hence a compromise, a via media on the constitutional question was imperative. To explore the various options in the middle of these two positions and to reach an agreement on a suitable scheme, the Atlee Government which had taken over power in Britain sent a mission of 3 of its Cabinet ministers to India to negotiate with Indian leaders.

The Cabinet Mission comprising Sir Stafford Cripps^[5], Lord Pethick-Lawrence and A.V.Alexander arrived in India on 24^th March 1946. During the next two months they conducted a series of discussions and parleys with various parties, communities, interests and the Princes of Indian States.

The main parleys obviously involved the Congress and League on the main constitutional question of one Union vs. Pakistan. Each side stuck to their original positions and pointed out weaknesses inherent in the other's scheme. But the series of discussions did produce some forward movement. Congress was willing to concede some degree of self-determination to the Muslim majority provinces to function as a group and to arm the Union with only the minimum of powers^[6]. The rest would remain with the provinces or be delegated to the Union by the provinces. The League was willing to consider the option of one Union provided the Union dealt only with foreign affairs, defence and communications for defence. It was not even willing to let the Union raise revenues for these subjects. It also demanded right for the groups to secede from the Union, to which the Congress was opposed. If the Union had any central legislature, the League demanded parity between Muslims and Non-Muslims.

After failing to bridge this divide the Cabinet Mission had 2 alternatives: declare the failure of the mission and go home or put out a proposal that they thought would be acceptable to both parties, based on the viewpoints put forth by the parties, and to form an interim government and constituent assembly based on this agreement. They chose the latter option and produced the Cabinet Mission Plan and published it on 16^th May 1946.


The salient aspects of this plan were

• ^{One Union with Central Legislature and Executive responsible for foreign affairs, defence and communications and the powers to raise revenues for these subjects}
• Provinces would be vested with all the residuary powers. They would be free to form groups. Provinces will have the option to get out of the group after the first general elections.
• The parties that accept the plan would be included in Viceroy's executive council which will function as the interim Government.
• A mechanism was laid out to describe how the groups to be formed. It required the delegates to meet in three sections initially and the section as a whole would decide if provinces in the section should join form groups or not, and set up the provincial constitutions.

An appraisal

Before proceeding further on the Congress and League reactions, I wish to record some observations about what the plan was about and what it was not.

The plan was not an agreement between the parties, but a suggested scheme for one. As the Mission stated clearly in its statement they would have preferred an agreement between the Congress and the League, without their involvement. In the absence of such agreement, the proposals in the scheme were what the Mission thought would have maximum chance of acceptability.

As a consequence, the plan, at least the major aspects of it, stood in their entirety and not amenable to selective agreement or subjective interpretation by the parties

The plan was not an award that would be enforced by British authority. It required the goodwill and mutual cooperation of all the parties for the successful working of the plan.

Nothing in the plan was sacrosanct and final; However any changes to the plan, especially major aspects (para 15) could only be done by mutual agreement.

The plan was not an immutable grand scheme for the constitution of United India. The plan itself provided a reconsideration of the terms of any constitution arrived according to the plan, after 10 years.

Congress and League Reactions

The plan gave the League the option of forming a "Pakistan" Group within the Union while rejecting its idea of partition and stated out compelling reasons against the division of India. After making some usual noises, holding forth eloquently about the imperious attitude of the British in denying and denigrating the Pakistan idea, the Muslim League accepted the Plan on June 6^th 1946 reserving their right to work towards their cherished goal of Pakistan from within the framework of groups and the Union.

The Congress initial response came out in its Working Committee resolution on May 24^th 1946. It was a commentary and a reaction to the plan; neither an acceptance nor rejection. The resolution stated that the option for joining the groups as one that could be exercised even prior to the constitution coming into effect. This had some legal basis as the document in para 15(5) stated that "Provinces should be free to form Groups with executives and legislatures, and each Group could determine the provincial subjects to be taken in common". The argument was that the option forced on provinces in the mechanism para 19 clause (v) violated the principle enunciated in para 15 clause (5) and to resolve this contradiction they interpreted it to mean the option to be exercised initially. This interpretation of the Congress was firmly refuted by the Mission and the Viceroy in their statement the very next day on May 25^th 1946. They reiterated that the "scheme stands as a whole" and the Congress interpretation of grouping "does not accord with the Delegation's intentions".

The provinces in contention were Assam and NWFP. According to the Mission plan, the members of the constituent assembly would meet in 3 sections. In Section A, the provinces of Madras, Central Provinces, Bombay, Bihar, UP, Orissa would meet and decide on the question of group formation. In Section B- Punjab, NWFP, Sindh would meet for the same purpose. In NWFP the Congress delegates were in majority, but the choice of its group would be decided by the Section-B as a whole, where the League was in majority. In Section C, Bengal and Assam would meet. Section C had 70 members: 36 Muslim and 34 Non-Muslim. Assam however was a 66% Hindu majority province whose choice of joining the "Pakistan" group would be decided by the Muslim majority dominated by Bengal. According to the plan, Assam and NWFP would be placed in the "Pakistan" group but would have a chance to opt out after the first general elections held under the new constitution. Hence under Congress interpretation, NWFP and Assam they would not even go into the "Pakistan" group.

Before or After: The wrangle

While sticking to their stand and not accepting the Mission's interpretation the Congress accepted the plan in its June 24^th working committee resolution. Jinnah was riled at this Congress "non-acceptance" acceptance. The Cabinet Mission tried to sort out this ambiguity to get clear statements from Congress on the grouping provisions. But Gandhiji wouldn't budge. He insisted on getting the Federal Court's interpretation as "law givers could not interpret their own law". ^[7]

The Mission pointed out to Gandhiji that this is not a legal issue, but a practical issue, that too on the singular pivotal aspect on which the whole scheme hinged. Even if the Federal Court were to agree with the Congress interpretation, Jinnah would bail out. If Muslim League would try to scuttle Assam's options in "Pakistan" Group, the Congress had ample opportunities in the Union Assembly to retaliate. But Congress would not budge, and curiously Sir Stafford Cripps and Lord Pethick-Lawrence did not insist on a clear answer in spite of repeated pleadings by Viceroy Lord Wavell to draw the line.

Jinnah was insistent that the Congress acceptance is no acceptance and warned that the League will revoke its acceptance in the absence of clarity from Congress. On July 10^th 1946, in a press conference in Bombay, Nehru tore apart the grouping provisions in the plan and dilated on the question of Union subjects. On 29th July 1946, the League Council at Bombay passed a resolution withdrawing its acceptance of the plan. The burial for the plan was laid between May 16th and July 29th 1946. The subsequent Calcutta Killings on "Direct Action" day on Aug 16th, October riots in Noakhali-Tipperah and the Bihar reprisals destroyed whatever hopes remained.

As a desperate measure, Atlee invited Nehru, Jinnah and Baldev Singh to London for a final patch up and to finalize the interpretation of the grouping provision. He also armed himself with the opinion of Lord Chancellor Jowett who advised that the Mission's interpretation was the correct one, but as a face saving measure to Congress, he was willing to let the matter be decided by Federal court. This was put out on a statement on Dec 6 1946. After cornered squarely, the Congress budged and came around. But the false hope that had been given to Assam and NWFP delegates created some problems. On Dec 15, 6 days after the constituent assembly first met, Gandhiji, in his unofficial capacity wrote to Assam delegates "As soon as the time comes for the Constituent Assembly to go into sections, you will say 'Gentlemen, Assam retires...' Else, I will say that Assam had only manikins, and no men." Finally on Dec 22, the Working committee passed a resolution accepting the plan with the original interpretation.

Questions and Observations

Why pick on the Congress alone? Wasn't the League's acceptance also conditional, in that it had still maintained that "a sovereign Pakistan was still the unalterable objective of Muslims in India"?

The League's intentions were to work for the consolidation of "Pakistan" group after getting into the Constituent assembly on the basis of the plan as a whole and further through the working of the constitution. It was a long term objective. Similarly the Congress would have been justified to "break the groups" after getting into the Constituent Assembly and then onwards. Once the country was sovereign each would have been justified to pursue their goals.

But the acceptance of the Mission plan implied that in the initial phase the Constituent Assembly was not wholly unconstrained to take decisions on the basis of majority, but to "bootstrap" itself based on prior agreements concluded outside the arena of constituent assembly. The provision of grouping was the singular essential element in it. If the Congress had fears about Assam it would have been better to negotiate to get safeguards from the League or changes in the plan by mutual agreement. But Congress was not justified to "accept" the plan on its own terms. The plan was an agreement in progress; it required the parties to execute their part of the concurrent promises through out its working. But the Congress actions at the initial stages of the plan, added distrust and suspicion, if there was shortage of any in League's mind towards it.

Why should the Indian National Congress sacrifice its principles to yield on the groups question on the basis of British and League Pressure?

Rather this question can be re-phrased and asked why even accept the Mission plan. To answer this one needs to approach this not from the view points of principles or stated positions but as a practical matter of various possibilities. There are different ways a constitution for a nation can be forged. In the presence of substantial unanimity on the concept of nationhood, boundaries, citizenship the constitution making body can deliberate to produce a political structure to govern the nation.

In the absence of agreement on these, there are only 2 options to preserve the Union. The first option is for the predominant party or group should undertake to enforce their will upon the unwilling parts or parties and drag them to the constituent assembly or decide on their behalf. The second option is to negotiate an a priori agreement, to produce a constitution, which is a contract of give and take, in order to accommodate the unwilling parts or parties to the Union. The constitution so arrived would buy the unity by giving up the strong national character of the center. This agreement definitely would preclude and prejudice the constitution making body in some aspects or the other.

It was amply clear in 1946 that there was no unanimity on the concept of our nationhood, boundaries, citizenship among Indians. The Congress's huge success in the freedom struggle should be seen in this light. It produced an overwhelming consensus that India should be free; but no overwhelming consensus on how India should be governed after we were free. That required another distinct phase of struggle. In that situation, it was imperative to give up some principles, to reach across and forge agreement on unity. If Union was desired, it was doubly imperative that agreement be reached, as the struggle for principles can be carried from within the Union, for without the union, the struggle either had to be given up or carried from the outside with impossible odds. To be fair to the Congress, in agreeing to the Mission Plan, it implicitly understood this principle. However by not agreeing to the grouping as proposed, it undermined the agreement seriously.

H.M.Seervai and A.G.Noorani argue that Jinnah's partition demand was a bargaining ploy and partition was his second best option. His first best option was autonomy for Muslim majority provinces and an equitable share in the center. In their view the group concept was a landing place offered to him by the Mission and he lapped it up and gave up on partition, practically. It was unwise of Congress to prick his ego on the group question while he was making his own psychological climb down and uncertain of Congress intentions.

Consider this situation. Even if we had a fragile Union, if Pakistan were to break up later, wouldn't it have broken up with even a larger territory, with its borders touching the outskirts of Delhi?

The question implies that "Pakistan" group formed by Sindh, Baluchistan NWFP, Undivided Bengal and Undivided Punjab would breakaway as Pakistan later. That would indeed put Gurgoan inside Pakistan, a rather depressing thought, I concede. Let us deal with it first in terms of principles and then on practical aspects. This question presumes that the "blessing" of the groups in the Constitution arrived according to the CMP also "blessed" sovereign distinct nationhood on them. That was the spin put out by the League in accepting the proposal, for political purposes to satisfy its own consistency and to retain their bargaining cards. The break up from the Union by the groups was not part of the plan. What was clearly spelt out was a reconsideration of the terms of constitution after 10 years. A break up by the "Pakistan" group as a whole indeed did not axiomatically follow from their existence as a group. This would have been a drastic revision of the constitution and would have necessitated the consideration of the whole question de novo and there was absolutely nothing binding the Congress to concede large parts of Bengal and Punjab where there was overwhelming Non-Muslims majority to this greater Pakistan formed by the break up.

Let me turn towards the practical aspects of the issue. If League attempted to consolidate the "Pakistan" group to form a greater Pakistan, Congress also had ample opportunities to tweak the League even within the Pakistan group. It was well known how hard League had to struggle to establish it its dominance in Sindh, Bengal and Punjab, in the increasing order of difficulty. For a brief discussion about the "uneasy" relation between the Punjab premier Sir Sikander Hyat-Khan and Jinnah read this insightful piece by A.G.Noorani^[8]

The 56% Muslim majority was not in the League's kitty wholly behind the question of Pakistan. There were powerful cross currents between the land owning class of all three religious groups Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs mostly to protect their property rights. The Unionist party symbolized this coming together. The division of Punjab was what they dreaded the most. ^[9] Though Sir Sikander died in 1942 and the Unionist party fizzled out after Partition, the propensity behind it is still alive and can be traced to this day in both West Punjab and East Punjab. The Choutalas, Badals , Shujaat Hussains are veritable inheritors of the Unionist legacy.

Similarly in Bengal too, the same peasant land owning interests had a cross current in the form of the Krishak Proja Party led by Fazlul Haq. It relied even more heavily on support from its Hindu members as Muslims counted for only 54% in the province.

Based on these facts, for Jinnah to get a greater Pakistan, he would have had to continuously use the religion card after the formation of the "Pakistan" group. But his card would have lost its sheen after he had reached an agreement in the Union. The local and provincial factors would have strengthened not weakened once the communal issue was settled, even if somewhat provisionally. This would have given ample opportunities to Congress to check and thwart this greater Pakistan demand.

On the other end of this effort, as the clamour for a sovereign Pakistan subsided, the minority muslims in UP, Bihar, Bombay would have had to be accommodated in the power structure. The Khaliquazzamans would have easily come around as it was exclusion in power which drove them to the League in the first place^[10].

But to do all this, Congress would have had to pacify its left wing and right wing supporters and to postpone its ambitious land reform program till the communal issue subsided and economic concerns became paramount. Indeed this was a very difficult task, personally for Nehru, but the consolation is, League faced greater troubles as it was even more reliant on land owner support and could not have outflanked the Congress to be a viable opposition in this issue.

At any rate the Congress capacity to fight a greater Pakistan would not have diminished but strengthened. If the scheme fell apart, with its strength in the Union, and its predominant position in current India, a Bengal and Punjab partition could have been eventuated and the current India as it is constituted today would have been secured.

Wouldn't India have got a weak center with a possible chance for balkanization?

I have some sympathy for this position. A.G. Noorani asserts in these articles at the footnote that India would have got a strong center not a weak one. However I am not convinced for the following reasons. There was no way an Art.355 or Art.356 becoming part of a constitution for this Union. Further more because of the strong provinces, central planning and taxation would have been weakened.

But the issue is very difficult to analyze as in 1947 many of provinces in India consumed more from the Central revenue pool than what they produced. An unlikely inclusion in this list is Punjab. Bengal's position was not that great either, with the current Bangladesh being a huge rural slum. These "Pakistan" provinces required help from the Union and in turn would have had to give up some "perks". The NWFP and Baluchistan entirely depended on federal revenue share to even subsist. But economics is not all and emotive factors play a huge role then and it is difficult to come up with their commensurate influence.

As far the balkanization question, it has to be considered separately from the Pakistan demand. At that time the Congress had predominant influence among the current India territory. The regional and other centrifugal tendencies were in the making and had not concretized yet. Even if it can be conceded that the current Pakistan would have broken away, it would have happened relatively earlier than when these other balkanizing factors became stronger to create any lasting effect. It can be asserted that Congress under Nehru's leadership was well placed to face this challenge and to secure current India as a whole.

We would have been back to square one you say, then why bother working the Cabinet Mission Plan?

To this a simple answer could be: just because we would have had the same results today does not mean we should have refused to start the experiment. The paths and predilections of the under taken experiment itself would have given us some lessons and benefits.

The primary benefit would be chance for the resolution of the question among the parties themselves without the involvement of outsiders. In the triangular relationship between the British-Congress-League, both the League and Congress trusted the British more than each other. This deep mutual distrust persists even today, after the British have been gone for 60 years.

If the Union experiment had been persisted, with the good will and mutual cooperation of the parties even for a relatively short period, while they were acting as sovereigns, it would have been unprecedented in history. This would have imparted some positive benefits for the future. Some of the benefits could have been the absence or resolution of conflicts such as Kashmir during the separation, some level of convergence on foreign policy and security perceptions.

Today the best case scenario as portrayed by experts is this situation is the resolution of Kashmir and a security pact. This best case would have been possible, say 50 years ago with greater chances of fruition than caused by the initial rancorous rupture and subsequent bitterness.

References

1.Transfer of Power in India : V.P. Menon

2.Partition : Legend and Reality , Constituitional Law of India : Vol 1 - Chapter 1 by H.M.Seervai

3.The Viceroy's Journal : Journal entries of Lord Wavell edited by Penderel Moon

4.Pakistan or the Partition of India: B.R.Ambedkar http://www.ambedkar.org/pakistan

Footnotes

[1]“Poems of partition - Bad poetry can sometimes tell us more than the finest history” by Ramachandra Guha , The Telegraph, Saturday, April 28, 2007. Link

[2] "Games historians play" –Irfan Husain , The Dawn Saturday August 34 2007 Link

[3]Jinnah said “If it comes to one man-one vote, then Brother Gandhi has 3 votes, I have only one"

[4]Subsequent elections to the Provincial legislatures presented a somewhat nuanced position. In the future Pakistan provinces of Sindh and Bengal, League had to enter into coalitions to form governments. In Punjab it was the single largest party, but lost power to a Unionist -Congress-Akali combination. In NWFP it lost to the Congress out rightly. However it won practically all the Muslim seats in current India.

[5]Sir Stafford Cripps was the President of the Board of Trade. Lord Pethick-Lawrence was the Secretary of State and A.V. Alexander the First Lord of the Admiralty.

[6]The Congress definition of ‘minimum’ as one would expect was entirely different from the League’s; it consisted of Foreign affairs, defence, communications, fundamental rights, customs and planning and all other subjects that would have to be administered by the union based on inter-relationships with these subjects

[7]Cripps and India's Partition – A.G.Noorani, The Frontline Volume 19 - Issue 15, July 20 - August 02, 2002 Part I and Part II

[8]Punjab and Pakistan – A. G. Noorani , The Frontline Volume 22 - Issue 06, Mar. 12 - 25 2005 Link

[9]I suggest the readers to read the brilliant speech by Sir Sikander in Punjab legislative Assembly on 11 March 1941 about the idea of Pakistan, which is presented as Appendix I in Transfer of Power in India by V.P.Menon. An online version is found in http://www.questia.com/ in the book Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution, 1921-47 Vol 1, but the site requires subscription.

[10]H.M.Seervai, V.P.Menon and B.R.Ambedkar are unanimous in this question.